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JUS COGENS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
COURTS: THE MEGA-POLITICAL SIDE
OF THE STORY
HÉLÈNE RUIZ FABRI* AND EDOARDO STOPPIONI**
I
INTRODUCTION
“Quand j’entends le mot jus cogens, je sors mon revolver.”1 In the French academic world, it is common to recall an anecdote according to which a very influential French legal adviser used this periphrasis to summarize the French position
vis-à-vis jus cogens.2 The deliberate choice of such a connotative metaphor illustrates how the category of peremptory norms has always been extremely divisive,
embodying in international law something that could be considered “mega-political” and its judicialization problematic.
Yet, transposing the study of the judicialization of mega-political issues to international law calls for some preliminary precautions, as the framing chapter by
Alter and Madsen, which opens this special issue, very well shows.3 The authors
engage with Ran Hirschl’s study of the judicialization of mega-political issues and
his definition of “the judicialization of ‘mega-politics’ or ‘pure’ politics [as] the
transfer to courts of contentious issues of an outright political nature and significance.”4 They further consider that “questions of pure politics include electoral
processes and outcomes, restorative justice, regime legitimacy, executive prerogatives, collective identity, and nation building.”5 As Alter and Madsen argue, the
transposition of the themes observed in constitutional law to international law
could involve not only a change of perspective but also of perception.6 Although
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1. “When I hear the word jus cogens, I pull out my gun” (authors’ translation).
2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 344 (“[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”).
3. Karen J. Alter & Mikael Rask Madsen, The International Adjudication of Mega-Politics, 84 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2021, at 1.
4. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 253, 253 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 2011).
5. Id.
6. See generally Alter & Madsen, supra note 3.
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this transposition remains about observing the structural movements affecting
international political debates, which are increasingly framed in terms of law and
rights.7 The core of the theoretical discussion lies in observing these structural
movements, which may be called the tectonics of mega-politics, that is, the forces
and movements which produce, or can produce, deformations of a “body.” In the
case of this investigation, the body is international law.
Such an approach consists of looking for the existence of a structural movement in the international legal order to identify the central political issues that
divide entire polities and to understand how the debate on their judicialization
points to an inevitable change in the configuration of international law. Indeed,
it is what several papers in this special issue try to demonstrate, although, as Alter
and Madsen show in their introduction, the outcome of the investigation is uneven.8
With regard to the approach Alter and Madsen propose, this study falls within
the third category of mega-political issues, the “sovereignty-based disputes where
judicial intervention interferes with deeply held notions of state sovereignty.”9
Yet, as the readers may quickly realize, this study takes an extra step. Alter and
Madsen take the stance that “[f]or the mega-political definition to hold, the possibility of rallying significant public support behind the political position must
also exist.”10 Notably, in their framework, this public support is derived from the
people constituting polities. In contrast, this article’s investigation starts with the
society of states as the classis structure over which international law was designed.
In order to identify how the concept of jus cogens destabilizes traditional
schemes, this study is located in the concept of the society of states, referred to
as a polity. In such a perspective, with reference to such a social group, jus cogens
is indeed a divisive issue (including in relation to the idea of democracy), although the notion as such does not refer to a specific content, which can be diverse, but to a tool or a vehicle.
With these specificities in mind, jus cogens is a perfect vantage point for investigating the mega-political side of international litigation, thanks to its very
paradoxical situation in this regard. In 1969, as a precondition to accepting the
inclusion of jus cogens in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
a number of states demanded the inclusion of Article 66, a provision requiring
the judicialization of jus cogens-related disputes. These states may have demanded this provision due to an underlying bet that it would have a deterrent
effect. Later, the occurrence of jus cogens in judicial proceedings triggered resistance and division. This reaction may have occurred because such proceedings

7. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (arguing that the judicialization of politics is part of a broader
process whereby elites insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics).
8. See generally Alter & Madsen, supra note 3.
9. Alter & Madsen, supra note 3, at 9.
10. Alter & Madsen, supra note 3, at 12.
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took place out of the box, that is, not in the frame initially planned in the VCLT.11
Be it as it may, the main features of a mega-political issue are there.
The theory of jus cogens implies certain fundamental principles that are peremptory and therefore do not allow any derogation. The concept of jus cogens—
that is of a core of norms of constitutional nature, including the principle of nonaggression or the prohibition of slavery, genocide, and piracy—was at the heart
of the claims of the non-aligned and socialist states12 at the time of decolonization,
especially during the negotiations of the VCLT in 1968–69, which witnessed a
whole spectrum of opinions regarding jus cogens.
At one end of the spectrum lied the perception that these norms would be a
tool for non-aligned and socialist states to free themselves from the form of domination embedded in the pre-existing international law architecture. This notion
of domination was incarnated in and symbolized by the figure of unequal treaties.
Support for this perception has gained traction in the doctrinal discourse and the
discourse of some international courts and tribunals. On the doctrinal side, the
writings of Mohammed Bedjaoui and scholars of the New International Economic Order have expanded the concept in terms of function and substance. For
example, ratione materiae, the right to development and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, was contended to be part of jus cogens.13
In structural terms, the existence of these norms would reflect a paradigm shift
from the colonial discourse of international law’s civilizing mission (“mission civilisatrice”), toward a commitment to the principles of fundamental justice, rejecting the binding value of treaty commitments because of their profoundly unequal
character.14
On the judicial side, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) has undergone a similar evolution, particularly under the influence of its former President Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade. Cançado
Trindade proudly observed that, “The Inter-American Court has probably done
for such identification of the expansion of jus cogens more than any other contemporary international tribunal.”15 First, the Court expanded the very function
of jus cogens, transforming it from a simple cause for invalidating treaties into a
polymorphous concept with broader implications. In its 2003 Opinion on the

11. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Comment on Article 66, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1513, 1518–20 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
12. See generally Umut Özsu, An Anti-Imperialist Universalism? Jus Cogens and the Politics of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EMPIRE: HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS 295 (Martti
Koskenniemi, Walter Rech, & Manuel Jiménez Fonseca eds., 2017) (analyzing the way in which jus cogens was deployed by socialist and non-aligned states).
13. See generally Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development and the Jus Cogens, 2 LESOTHO
L.J. 93 (1986).
14. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 184–86 (1979); Problèmes Récents de Succession d’États dans les États Nouveaux, 130 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 455, 455–585 (1970).
15. Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R.
(ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 92 (Mar. 11, 2005) (separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
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rights of undocumented migrants, the Court made it clear that the concept extended beyond its original framework, the law of treaties, and explained that it
pervaded all branches of international law.16 In the Brothers Gómez Paquiyauri
v. Peru case, the Court broadened the scope of application of jus cogens, finding
that it applies equally in times of peace, war, or emergency.17 In these decisions,
the Court also began to broaden the concept of jus cogens substantively: in the
2003 opinion, the Court considered the principle of equality to be peremptory;18
in the Gómez Paquiyauri judgment, it incorporated the prohibition of extrajudicial executions.19 This was the first step in a series of decisions along the same
lines: eventually incorporating prohibitions on inhuman treatment and corporal
punishment,20 forced disappearances,21 discrimination,22 and the execution of persons under eighteen years of age.23
These examples show that jus cogens has escaped the box of the law of treaties
to which it was initially confined. Yet, one cannot ignore how much these developments remain controversial. Even in the tight frame of the VCLT, jus cogens
was considered a threatening enough notion to trigger France’s lonely refusal to
even sign the convention. And still, fifty years after the conclusion of the convention, France has yet to ratify the VCLT, despite the fact that the country implements most of the VCLT in its daily international practice.24 Of course, one swallow does not a summer make.
Indeed, France’s stance can be seen as expressing the other end of the abovementioned spectrum. Nobody could straightforwardly reject a notion that translates into law the idea of higher morality and norms bearing equally on all members of the international community, especially considering undeniable examples
such as the prohibition of aggression or of genocide. For this reason, the debate
shifted to the conditions of implementing jus cogens and the guarantees against
its abuse. The risks put forward were a potential instability of convention relationships and the related uncertainty of international relations.

16. See Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 98–99 (Sept. 17, 2003).
17. See Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Merits, Judgments and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶¶ 111–12 (July 8, 2004).
18. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, supra note 16, ¶ 100.
19. Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶ 76.
20. See Caesar, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 70; Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, ¶ 126 (July 4, 2006).
21. Goiburú v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 153, ¶ 93 (Sept. 22, 2006).
22. See YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 184 (June 23, 2005).
23. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 8 (2002).
24. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, La France et la Convention de Vienne Sur le Droit des Traités, in LA FRANCE
ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 137, 137–67 (Gérard Cahin, Florence Poirat & Sandra Szurek eds., 2007).
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The pending question regarding the implementation of jus cogens was: who
would decide which norm is of jus cogens? What would be the pragmatic translation of the vague concept of an international community of states as a whole?
The United Nations General Assembly, on the verge of falling into the delights
of automatic majority, was the favourite of some to decide which norms are of
jus cogens, but this idea was rebutted by others. Those in disagreement argued
that a body deprived of any legislative power could not suddenly become a superlegislator.25 Here again, opinions opposing jus cogens have gained traction in the
doctrinal discourse and the discourse of some international courts and tribunals.
The writings of numerous authors, some of them considered especially conservative, have gone on denying the relevance of jus cogens in the current state of the
international legal order as they see it, pointing to the dangers of such a romantic
or utopian notion.26
Along these lines, The International Court of Justice (ICJ) resisted for a long
time before even using the term jus cogens. Still, the first occurrence was to cite
Portugal’s argument in the Timor case,27 so it was not the ICJ’s own discourse.
Ten more years were necessary for the ICJ to mention jus cogens in its reasoning,
and even then, the jus cogens argument was not conclusive.28 Whether such longlasting resistance was related or not to an intense internal lobbying of the French
judge, well known for his strong opposition to jus cogens, is impossible to say.
However, the ICJ stayed its hand for as long as it could, and in some ways, probably still does.
Thus, the debate and its related divisions are far from being over. The VCLT
has not gained many more ratifications over the past thirty years, and the reservations to provisions related to jus cogens, especially to Article 66, have not receded. This does not equate to a status quo. If need be, the recent work of the
25. See generally Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 413 (1983) (arguing inter alia that the resolutions of international organizations can be an important
step in the process of elaborating international norms, but cannot be the formal source of those norms).
26. Michael J. Glennon, De L’Absurdité du Droit Impératif (Jus Cogens), 110 REVUE GENERALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 529, 529 (2006). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (summarizing neoconservative objections to the modern international law regime); Serge Sur, Les Phénomènes de Mode
en Droit International, in COLLOQUE DE PARIS: LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET LE TEMPS 49, 53 (A.
Pedone ed., 2001).
27. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 30 (June 30) (“[T]he principal matters
on which its claims are based, namely the status of East Timor as a non-self-governing territory and its
own capacity as the administering Power of the Territory, have already been decided by the General
Assembly and the Security Council, acting within their proper spheres of competence; that in order to
decide on Portugal’s claims, the Court might well need to interpret those decisions but would not have
to decide de novo on their content and must accordingly take them as ‘givens’; and that consequently the
Court is not required in this case to pronounce on the question of the use of force by Indonesia in East
Timor or upon the lawfulness of its presence in the Territory.”).
28. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 125 (February 3) (“[T]he mere fact that rights and obligations erga
omnes or peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in
itself constitute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the
parties.”).
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International Legal Commission (ILC) and its Special Rapporteur29 on the topic
is a testimony to the divisive potential of jus cogens. This work shows how much
opinions on jus cogens are not only subject to various political agendas but also
diverging visions of the international legal order and the role of the judge.
In such context, the aim of this article is threefold. On the one hand, it seeks
to study jus cogens as a mega-political tool in the hands of the judge, to demonstrate how the adjudication of jus cogens crystallizes in international law questions about the tectonics of mega-politics (Part II). On the other hand, it seeks to
confirm that the evolution of the judicial discourse on jus cogens can be understood as the oscillation between an apologetic attitude opposed to the tectonics
of its mega-political nature and a utopian desire to envisage it as the tool of a
progressive systemic project (Part III). However, the article’s ambition is not only
to take stock of the usual terms of controversy, which correspond to the basic
moves in the tectonics of mega-politics, but also aims to include an examination
of the procedural potential of jus cogens. Whereas the ILC’s work reveals the
procedural hurdles blocking the development of jus cogens,30 understanding the
original historical promise of jus cogens from a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) perspective can reveal its procedural potential as an
emancipatory tool for the most vulnerable (Part IV).
II
JUS COGENS AS A MEGA-POLITICAL ISSUE
As observed in the discussion above, it can be misleading to simply transpose
examples of mega-politics to international law. Changing the context engenders
a risk of either expanding the boundaries of the mega-politics concept ad libitum
or losing the intellectual project that underlies the understanding of the category.
More than in any other branch of public law, the international judge is aware of
the inescapably political nature of the disputes he must resolve, as a well-known
dictum of the ICJ underlines:
legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and long-standing political
dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view been put forward before
that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political
dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue
between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of the Court’s functions or jurisdiction

29. See Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens), First Rep. on Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/693 (Mar. 8, 2016); Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens), Second Rep. on Jus Cogens,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/706 (Mar. 16, 2017); Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens), Third Rep. on
Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 (Feb. 12, 2018); Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur on Jus Cogens),
Fourth Rep. on Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727 (Jan. 31, 2019); see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on
the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 141–203 (2019).
30. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The Eternal Question of Jus Cogens Running into Procedural Hurdles, 24
AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 141–62 (2021).
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be found in the Charter or the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its
settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international
disputes.31

This article does not seek to assess the impact of mega-political issues on international decision-making as such. It is important to distinguish the analysis of
jus cogens from the scepticism that some international lawyers may harbour towards studies of the effects of politics on international law or vice versa. As Martti
Koskenniemi has pointed out, “[s]uch an enquiry would be like examining Christianity’s relationship to religion.”32 International law, as a technical language used
to express certain political claims in legal terms, is an expression of politics.
Therefore, it is impossible to consider international law and politics as two separate entities.
No matter what one might think of this theoretical objection, it is interesting
to observe how the language of the judge adapts to a particular type of cases.
Indeed, calling a normative phenomenon jus cogens creates a methodological
perplexity for the positivist. As Koskenniemi describes, “The distinctions between hard and soft law, rules and principles, regular norms and jus cogens, for
instance, are suspect: these only betray political distinctions that undermine the
law’s objectivity.”33 This investigation of the way the international courts’ discourse manipulates peremptory norms seeks to examine how judges deal with
the tectonics of mega-politics. To do so, this analysis distils indirectly from
Hirschl’s work and directly from Alter and Madsen’s framing chapter the fundamental issues raised in the jurisdictional context. From there, it develops a metatheoretical analysis to understand these issues in the broader context of international law.
A. Defining the Content of Mega-Politics: Issues That Divide Polities
Hirschl included in the content of mega-politics “matters of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole polities.”34 The peremptory norms seem to correspond to this idea of “matters of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole polities.”35 Indeed,

31. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
¶ 37 (May 24).
32. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v (2011) (“I do not think
there are such separate entities. Nothing in this book participates in the sometimes fashionable enquiries
of international law’s ‘impact’ on politics or vice-versa. Such an enquiry would be like examining Christianity’s relationship to religion. The relationship (if that is the correct word) is not one of two entities
colliding against each other but one of identity. International law is an expression of politics much like
Christianity constitutes one type of expression of religious spirituality. Both also operate as technical
languages that are resorted to by trained professionals and lay persons alike in order to communicate
human aspirations, fears and ambitions.”).
33. Id. at 41.
34. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 93, 94 (2008).
35. Id.
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in his analysis of the different discourses on jus cogens, Robert Kolb highlights a
deep divergence within the international law community. Jus cogens is seen either
as a dream or as the pinnacle of a new international legal order that has found a
receptacle for its most fundamental values.36 Thinking about jus cogens as a
mega-political issue focuses less on identifying different layers of varying political
intensity in international disputes. Instead, focus is placed on highlighting the
particularism of certain disputes that call for the application of norms claimed to
be at the top of a hierarchical normative structure.
Concerning the concept of mega-political disputes before the international
court, Alter and Madsen consider that “mega-political disputes involve substantive issues that deeply divide societies such that one can predict that at least one
important social group will be upset by the outcome.”37 The international adjudication of disputes involving jus cogens norms can be seen to fall within this definition at different levels.
First, jus cogens can concern disputes on legal issues that divide national polities. A recent example lies in the story leading up to the Germany v. Italy case
before the ICJ, and the subsequent reaction of the Italian Constitutional Court.38
The background is the still sensitive issue of war reparations, as several Italian
nationals sought reparations from Germany in Italian courts for wartime human
rights violations. In a first upward movement, the dispute moved from the national to the international level: a Florentine judge tried to redefine the contours
of sovereign immunity. Specifically, this judge introduced an exception based on
jus cogens to lift the veil of sovereign immunity, even in the ambit of jure imperii
acts. The German government strongly opposed this position before the ICJ,
which formally reiterated the distinction between procedure, the level where immunities play, and substance to reject the Italian argument. A later downward
movement generated a huge debate among international lawyers. When the ICJ’s
answer on the jus cogens exception reached the Italian Constitutional Court, the
latter used a strongly dualistic discourse—in the manner of Kadi39—to say that, if
the ICJ’s decision reflected the state of customary international law, this conception would not have permeated the Italian legal order because it was contrary to
the most fundamental national values. Consequently, this case has rekindled
lively debates among international lawyers on the scope and effects of peremptory norms.
Second, jus cogens disputes usually concern issues that divide the community
of states. Indeed, from the outset, this legal concept has been the product of intense confrontation between two cohorts of states. While Third World and Soviet
Bloc states saw jus cogens as a promise to reform and secure their rights, Western

36. ROBERT KOLB, THÉORIE DU IUS COGENS INTERNATIONAL – ESSAI DE RELECTURE DU
CONCEPT 24 (2001).
37. See Alter & Madsen, supra note 3, at 8.
38. See generally Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening),
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (February 3).
39. See generally Case C-402/05, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351.
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countries feared its indeterminacy and risky drawbacks. This opposition is not
only reflected in the split between the positions taken during negotiations on Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT,40 but also in the disagreement on Article 66, which
concerned dispute settlement in cases where a jus cogens norm is involved.41
While Third World and Soviet Bloc states adopted a language of renewed morality (seeing jus cogens as a reflection of a “shared philosophy of values,”42 the
“universal legal conscience of civilised countries,”43 the “higher interests of the
international community as a whole,”44 or the “very concept of justice.”45), Western countries opposed it with doubts about a morality that is difficult to define.46
Interestingly, argumentative strategies regarding jus cogens have repeatedly
shifted and reversed over time. As Umut Özsu has perceptively noted, First
World states began to attack jus cogens in the name of the sacrosanct idea of
sovereignty at a time when “transnational law” was colonizing their discourse on
public international law.47 At the same time, socialist states shifted from their traditional aversion to unwritten law and their preference for treaty law as the
guardian of sovereignty, to the defence of peremptory norms as the cornerstones
of the international community’s general interest. Paradoxically, “[T]he utopia
of a normatively integrated international order became the apology of state
power; the apology of state power produced the utopia of a normatively integrated international order.”48
Finally, jus cogens disputes may have a mega-political dimension to the extent
that their resolution reflects a fundamental structural transformation in the architecture of the international legal order. The relationship of the ICJ with jus
cogens is characteristic of the paradoxes of jus cogens. Indeed, peremptory norms
call on the Court to say whether a specific norm has the status of jus cogens, to
define what the prohibition is, and to clarify the norm’s content. However, in
doing so, they also call for a “transformation de la société tel qu’un co-législateur,

40. See generally Özsu, supra note 12, at 295–98 (describing the negotiations between Western, socialist, and Third World states surrounding Article 53).
41. See generally Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Comment on Article 66, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1513, (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
42. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 52nd mtg. at 297. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11
(May 4, 1968).
43. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 53rd mtg. at 301. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11
(May 6, 1968).
44. Id. at 305.
45. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 29th mtg. at 154. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11
(April 18, 1968).
46. That was essentially the position of France that rejected the VCLT as a whole because of jus
cogens. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 24, at 137–67.
47. Özsu, supra note 12, at 305.
48. Id.
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changement que la Cour est pourtant incapable d’instituer dans la société dans laquelle elle opère.”49 The Court, operating in a legal system conceived as the product of voluntarism and on a voluntary jurisdictional basis, is invited to press the
limits of this voluntarism. By invoking jus cogens, the Court is asked to legislate
on the content of rules that are removed from the will of the subjects of the international legal order.
It is important to recognize that many of the problems related to the settlement of jus cogens disputes correspond to a clash of conceptions. On the one
hand, a traditional and Eurocentric vision has portrayed peremptory norms as an
“ethical minimum.”50 Behind a language of universalism, jus cogens becomes a
tool for certain actors to articulate “the universal legal conscience of civilised
countries.”51 It is no coincidence that the link between mandatory standards and
the protection of the “international community” is the result of an amendment
by Spain, Greece and Finland in the travaux préparatoires of Article 53 VCLT.52
On the other hand, the Third World view made jus cogens the tool for consolidating their newly achieved self-determination, formulating it in an emancipatory
language that defends the vulnerable.
B. Adjudicating Mega-Politics: Questioning the Role of the Judge
Although the concept of “mega-politics” in Hirschl’s work is usually linked
to an eponymous article from 2008, the idea is deeply rooted in earlier work. In
constitutional law scholarship, the judicialization of politics is linked to a classic
discussion of constitutional design: the legitimacy of constitutional review by
courts. In the late twentieth century, the “popular constitutionalism” movement
proposed a counterweight to judicial constitutional review. These left-wing critics
suggested that in order to reconcile parliamentary supremacy with the supremacy
of the constitution, it was necessary to “take the Constitution away from
courts.”53 The central concerns of this movement were that conservatives used
courts as a weapon to limit progressive legislative action in essentially political
controversies, and that judicial review reduced focus on achieving social change
through political action by instead diverting all energy toward the judicial process.54
The latter argument seems to underlie Hirschl’s approach, as “the constitutionalization of what he calls ‘mega-politics’ imposed several limiting factors on

49. Raphaëlle Rivier, Droit Impératif et Juridiction (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas) (on file with Author) (“[T]ransformation of society as a co-legislator, a
change that the Court is unable to institute in the society in which it operates.”).
50. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571, 574 (1937).
51. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43.
52. A. Gomez Robledo, Le Jus Cogens International: Sa Genèse, Sa Nature, Ses Fonctions, 172
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 9, 37–69 (1981).
53. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 1
(2000).
54. See generally id.
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the possibilities for true transformation from below.”55 This thesis refers to the
more general argument in his book Towards Juristocracy,56 where Hirschl challenged the common view that the constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review have progressive origins and are intended to promote
the diffusion or redistribution of power. On the contrary, Hirschl locates the
move towards juristocracy in a fundamental historical shift that began with the
end of the Cold War. Traditionally, mega-political issues were reserved for different mechanisms of popular organization, such as grassroots political action.
But from the late 1990s onwards, a paradigm shift began to transform these political demands for change in terms of the logic of law. Elites and international
institutions seem to shy away from political action associated with violence and
uncertainty, preferring instead the orderly model of legal discourse and court decision-making. Along these lines, socio-political change was reoriented under the
label of law; a new logic emerged where demands for change are structured in a
rights-based form and brought to courts.57
Can a similar trend be identified for international law? It is undeniable that
from the 1990s onwards, international law has undergone an intense process of
judicialization. During this time, the number of international courts and tribunals
has multiplied, and their mandates have significantly expanded.58 International
lawyers have rarely questioned this process, which is seen as an additional degree
of maturity of the international legal phenomenon. Rather, fears have focused on
the risks of fragmentation of the international order, fractured into different legal
spheres, each with its own political agenda.59
Several states, especially in the West, conditioned their acceptance of jus cogens being included in the VCLT on the correlative inclusion of a dispute settlement mechanism involving binding decisions made by arbitrators or the ICJ (Article 66). The states saw this as a safeguard against abusive allegations concerning
the jus cogens character of certain norms. This procedural mechanism was intended to give judges the final say when the existence of a jus cogens norm was
disputed. Interestingly, this was done in 1969, shortly after the very conservative
and equally controversial ICJ decision in the South West Africa case.60 It is interesting to relate the timing of these events to possible interpretations of the rise of
55. MARK GOODALE, A REVOLUTION IN FRAGMENTS: TRAVERSING SCALES OF JUSTICE,
IDEOLOGY, AND PRACTICE IN BOLIVIA 93 (2019).
56. See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 7 (arguing that the trend toward constitutionalization is the
product of a strategic interplay among political elites, economic stakeholders, and judicial leaders).
57. GOODALE, supra note 55, at 69–70.
58. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014) (charting developments and trends in the creation and role of international
courts).
59. See generally Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2020).
60. Liberia and Ethiopia had attempted an actio popularis claim that the Court rejected. See generally Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June
21).
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juristocracy.
Some mega-political issues, resolved with a rights-based approach, cause a
structural change in a given societal framework. The same is true for international adjudication: the empowerment of the judge to resolve mega-political issues provokes structural movements that can be interrogated. The fundamental
question is to identify the societal impact of the international judge’s discourse
when dealing with such issues. Part III addresses the set of questions relating to
the international judge’s ability to handle a disruptive instrument like jus cogens.
This reasoning goes hand in hand with the question of whether international adjudication should be the means of dealing with such mega-political situations or
whether the trend should be reversed, and the involvement of the international
judge in mega-politics should be limited.61
III
THE AXIOLOGICAL MATERIALITY OF JUS COGENS: SHOULD THE JUDGE
SPEAK OUT?
In international law doctrine, it is common to link the fact that jus cogens
norms aim at protecting values of the highest importance for the entire international community with their close relationship to morality. This link between jus
cogens and morality has been considered “the most usual and frequent explanation of a norm’s peremptory character.”62 This link is traditionally attributed to
the separate opinion of Judge Schücking in the Oscar Chinn case, considering
that “the Court would never […] apply a convention the terms of which were
contrary to public morality.”63 But the link has now become a standard part of
the argument: during the ILC’s work on the Vienna Convention, Special Rapporteurs Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice also considered that the peremptory character of a norm was derived from the fact that it was a manifestation of international morality.64 This axiological explanation has gradually faded away, as the
notion of “general interest” has replaced the difficulty of the moral content explanation.65
Despite the shift in discourse, this axiological materiality of peremptory
norms has continued to pose problems for judicial intervention. This part will
examine how the discourse of international law has articulated concerns about
61. See Alter & Madsen, supra note 3 (posing questions about the proper role of international adjudication).
62. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 59, 62 (2005).
63. Oscar Chinn (Brit. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. Rep. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 148, 150 (Dec.
12) (separate opinion by Schücking, M.).
64. Report by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 155, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/61; Third Report by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, [1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
20, 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/155.
65. Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 55,
58 (1966); Jochen Frowein, Jus Cogens, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327, 329
(R. Bernhardt ed., 1984).
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the adequacy of judicial intervention in a mega-political subject. First, the most
troubling claim in this respect is whether, in such cases, the judge must be silenced
for justice to be expressed. Second, when the judge intervenes in the recognition
of a jus cogens norm, his action is closely linked to a structural problem of “verticalization.” Third, the consequences of exercising jurisdiction in these cases
means that the judge often becomes the target of criticism.
A. A Moral Problem: The Silence of the Judge/The Voice of Justice?
A generalized unease with the moral nature of jus cogens is intrinsic to the
discourse of international lawyers on peremptory rules. Some authors try to sanitize this value dimension, focusing on a strictly technical approach that avoids
tackling the symbolic value of these rules. Other authors focus exclusively on the
moral dimension, ignoring the technical problems of jus cogens.66 The latter approach would highlight the fact that jus cogens is primarily a moral issue. Yet,
even in this respect, two opposing positions can be identified regarding what this
moral phenomenon entails in terms of judicial intervention.
Advocates of jus cogens tend to believe in the importance of judicial means
to resolve disputes involving it. Antonio Cassese, for example, believed that the
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction in this area would provide “an authoritative third
party determination of jus cogens [constituting] a welcome safeguard against any
abuse.”67 Recourse to judges is necessary because it is the only way to ensure that
the norm invoked is of central concern to the international community. Cassese’s
position in favour of a greater role for the judge is rooted in the belief that the
international judiciary is the part of the international legal order that can bring
about change and be less prone to conservatism.68
A similar enthusiasm for the role of the international judge in relation to jus
cogens results from the separate opinion of Judge Dugard in Congo v. Rwanda.
The starting point of this decision is the open acceptance of a rather realist approach to adjudication, where international judges make decisions based on both
principles and policies. Since jus cogens norms “advance both principle and policy . . . they must inevitably play a dominant role in the process of judicial
choice.”69 Even more, international judges who invoke jus cogens “affirm the high
principles of international law, which recognise the most important rights of the
international order” and “give legal form to the most fundamental policies or
goals of the international community.”70

66. See generally Thomas Kleinlein, Jus Cogens Re-examined: Value Formalism in International
Law, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 295 (2017) (discussing various scholarly approaches to jus cogens).
67. Antoine Cassese, For an Enhanced Role of Jus Cogens, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 158, 169 (Antoine Cassese ed., 2012).
68. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Enhancing the Rhetoric of Jus Cogens, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1049, 1054–55
(2012).
69. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional
Measure, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 265, ¶ 10 (July 10) (separate opinion by Dugard, J.).
70. Id.
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Martti Koskenniemi took a different position in his commentary on the ICJ’s
silence in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear
Weapons. In his view, the international judicial system is not fit to speak about
the “massive killing of the innocent,” as it is unable to address the political and
moral dilemma underlying the case: “for the voice of justice to be heard, law must
sometimes remain silent.”71 His reasoning could be transposed to cases involving
jus cogens violations to reflect on the relevance of judicial involvement. For
Koskenniemi, the first reason for this silence is the weakness of legal language:
judges resolve international disputes by referring to technical rules and interpretation techniques that are considerably weaker than the values at stake in the
murder of innocents. The second reason is the articulation of absolute rules and
relative principles in judicial reasoning, as this allows the impact of an absolute
rule (like a ban) to be modulated in particular cases. The use of the relative principle of proportionality, for example, would involve “thinking about the killing
of the innocent in terms of gains and losses,”72 which is not neutral. Third, legal
reason is epistemologically limited: while the belief that mass murder of innocents is wrong does not need to be justified by reference to any other truth, the
truth of legal norms always depends on the truth of another proposition about its
authority. The idea is that “legal reason is premised on the assumption that obligations exist (or are valid) by virtue of there having been an anterior fact of a
certain sort (…). The prohibition of the massive killing of the innocent, however,
cannot be derived in this way without losing its force.”73
This debate highlights the need to step back and ask whether the greater the
value underlying a norm, the more a judicial mechanism is needed to enforce it.
Cassese’s position ignores the problems associated with the ability of the judicial
voice to deal with issues as humanly complex as those at stake in the sphere of
jus cogens. Whether the coldness of judicial application of law is not incompatible
with protected values is a fundamental question—“for the meaning of the massive killing of the innocent is conveyed neither by applying technical rules or principles nor by deferring to professional authority.”74 For Koskenniemi, Cassese’s
assertion that the courts are there because “il ne faut pas oublier”75 is highly problematic, as it assumes that the judge can establish the truth in these cases, whereas
“a judicial ‘truth’ is a truth produced by the weak and highly selective idiosyncrasies of legal process and evidence.”76

71. Martti Koskenniemi, The Silence of Law-The Voice of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 488, 489 (Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes & Phillippe Sands eds., 1999).
72. Id. at 497.
73. Id. at 499.
74. Id. at 508.
75. “One should not forget.”
76. Id. at 504.
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At the same time, the idea that judges should not pronounce on cases at the
heart of international society’s most fundamental concerns is also somehow paradoxical.77 Admittedly, the judge’s voice will never match the horror of the issues
at stake, as his response risks trivializing the nature of the problem through technical rhetoric. However, taking this reasoning too far risks blocking the functioning of international criminal justice as a whole, or stifling human rights courts on
the most serious issues. A similar situation arose in the case of Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo. The Court reiterated its 1951 position that a reservation to the Genocide Convention excluding the Court’s jurisdiction is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. The dissenting judges, Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, took the opposite position, stating
forcefully that:
It is a matter for serious concern that at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is
still for States to choose whether they consent to the Court adjudicating claims that they
have committed genocide. It must be regarded as a very grave matter that a State should
be in a position to shield from international judicial scrutiny any claim that might be
made against it concerning genocide. A State so doing shows the world scant confidence
that it would never, ever, commit genocide, one of the greatest crimes known.78

This debate shows the issues surrounding the ability of judicial discourse to
capture the complexity of the mega-political content of jus cogens. The idea that
the judicial response is inadequate can be advanced for different objectives: to
bar any possibility of judgement on the most serious violations of international
law, or to show the structural limits of the judicial response. This diversity nevertheless confirms the importance of taking the debate seriously.
B. A Structural Problem: The Discourse of Verticalization
The second discursive trend concerning the moral content of jus cogens tends
to highlight the technical dimension of this normative vehicle, specifically the creation of a “higher law” in the international legal order. The technical logic underlying the functioning of jus cogens is that of verticalization. By inserting a hierarchy into an international legal order that is traditionally based on the
equivalence of sources, jus cogens allows for the recognition of the superiority of
certain fundamental principles.
It is no coincidence that this idea of superior norms is a privileged element of
the discourse on global constitutionalism, as the peremptory norms placed at the
top of the legal system pursue a logic of constitutional order: “[I]n order to keep
fragmented units together, something of a higher status must be involved and
invoked, and it is precisely constitutionalism, or constitutionalization, that promises to be able to create some order in what otherwise would be chaos.”79 Scholarship on this kind of constitutionalization “identified fundamental norms with
77. See Alter & Madsen, supra note 3.
78. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006
I.C.J. Rep. 65, ¶ 25 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion by Higgins, R., Kooijmans, P., Elaraby, N., Owada, H. &
Simma, B.).
79. Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1,
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the distinguishing traits of a constitutionalization process” and “laid down the
theoretical foundations of a world order based on a priority of values reflecting a
hierarchy of norms.”80 In doing so, it “broke away from the traditional principle
of mutual flexibility between the sources, whereby treaty and customary law rules
could derogate from one another.”81
This process influences the judge when they use a jus cogens argument. The
judge deploys a discourse of verticalization and is thus seen as introducing a hierarchy into a system that traditionally rejects it. This verticalization represents
one of the risks of the relativization of normativity in international law that Prosper Weil has identified. In his view, super-normativity occupies a central place
among the pathologies affecting the normativity of international law. Jus cogens
attempts to introduce a value hierarchy into an intersubjective, consent-based,
and therefore horizontal international legal order. In this sense, Jus cogens is necessarily alien to the traditional structure of international law. Weil would say that
verticality disturbs the normative metabolism of international law.82
Thus, the fundamental reason for criticising the judicial use of such a megapolitical concept is that it requires a normative structure that seems iconoclastic
to the international legal order. The ICJ has in fact long resisted this category of
norms, preferring more certain categories, at the expense of clarity in its case-law
on the topic. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court cited examples of erga
omnes83 obligations which were all jus cogens norms without the name, which was
kept at arm’s length.84 In the Wall opinion, the ICJ adopted the ILC’s reasoning
on the legal consequences of a serious breach of a peremptory norm by using the
regime of erga omnes obligations, but again did not explicitly name them as jus
cogens.85 In 1996, the Court preferred to bypass the word and spoke of “intransgressible principles of humanitarian law” concerning the prohibition of mass-destruction weapons.86 When it finally used the concept of jus cogens, the Court
filled it out in a minimalist way, at least with the prohibition of genocide, and
recalled that its normative content was a separate issue from the existence of the
Court’s jurisdiction.87

15 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009).
80. Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 491, 494 (2008).
81. Id. at 495.
82. Prosper Weil, Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité: Cours Général de Droit International Public, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE LA HAYE EN LIGNE 11, 261–73 (1992).
83. Erga omnes refers to obligations that states have to all other states.
84. See Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and Other Rules – The Identification
of Fundamental Norms, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21, 22
(Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
85. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 159 (July 9).
86. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 266, ¶
79 (July 8).
87. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006
I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶¶ 64, 69, 125 (Feb. 3). The Court reiterated what it had already said concerning erga omnes
obligations in the East Timor case. East Timor, Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30).

RUIZ FABRI & STOPPIONI (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2021]

JUS COGENS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS

1/13/2022 1:40 PM

169

Furthermore, the discourse of verticalization is said to lead to problematic
results in different sub-branches of international law. Thus, in international human rights law, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights receives criticism
because of its repeated discovery of jus cogens norms. These discoveries would
be problematic because of the resulting hierarchization of human rights norms.
On the one hand, the distinction of some human rights standards as being higher
than others would contradict the philosophy of the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which is based on the indivisibility of human rights.88 The establishment of a hierarchy implies different levels of importance in an area where
all rights should be considered axiologically equal and ultimately mutually supportive. On the other hand, this judicially established hierarchy of norms would
potentially contradict the distinction in existing human rights treaties between
rights that tolerate derogations and those that do not.89
In the same vein, various sceptical views point to the dangers of the hierarchy
of values in international human rights law. For example, Elaine Webster has
shown that the focus on torture distracts from and impoverishes the notions of
inhuman and degrading treatment.90 Similarly, Philippe Sands has shown that
“over time genocide emerged in the eyes of many as the crime of crimes, a hierarchy that left a suggestion that the killing of large numbers of people as individuals was somehow less terrible.”91 As a result, this elevation of genocide tends to
demote the other crimes against humanity within an informal hierarchy in international criminal law.
The risks of verticalization are even more evident in international investment
law. There, jus cogens may become a means of reducing human rights issues to
extremes with which economic arbitrators are unfamiliar. Even where investment
tribunals show openness to “exogenous” sources of international law, their discourse actually leads to an expansion of the “economic” idiom without a genuine
commitment to taking these exogenous sources seriously. In the Phoenix case,
the tribunal expanded the concept of “protected investment” by introducing into
the Salini test an implicit requirement of legality and good faith whose theoretical
justification lies in a “teleological reading” of “protected investment” based on

88. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993) (“All human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent
and interrelated.”).
89. Catherine Maia, Le Jus Cogens dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de
l’Homme, in LE PARTICULARISME INTERAMERICAIN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 271, 271–311 (Ludovic
Hennebel & Hélène Tigroudja eds., 2009).
90. See generally Elaine Webster, Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture: Making Sense of ‘Dignity’ Talk, 17 HUM. RTS. REV. 371 (2016).
91. PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 6 (2006). Sands identified this hierarchy with the two opposing visions of the ratio of international criminal law’s protection. Lauterpacht’s idea, according to whom the protection of individuals
had to translate into the concept of crimes against humanity, was challenged by the idea of Lemkin,
according to whom the international legal order owed reprobation above all against those acts aiming at
the eradication of a group.
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general principles of international law.92 Nevertheless, the tribunal explained
that:
[N]obody would suggest that ICSID protection should be granted to investments made
in violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking
of human organs.93

Assuming that primary human concerns are taken into account at this early
stage of legal reasoning, the hyperbole expressed in the award shows that the
arbitrators felt the need to choose extreme examples in order not to diminish the
overriding importance of investment concerns.94 To this extent, it looks more like
paying lip service to political correctness than genuine engagement.
In sum, how can jus cogens be uncontroversial when it confronts all actors in
international law with a contradiction? Specifically, the question of how to install
a hierarchy in the law of a social group that does not have an institutional apparatus supporting or echoing that hierarchy and, therefore, is not equipped to draw
clear consequences from it?95
C. A Problem of Consequences: The Judge as a Target of Criticism
The consequences of the judicial use of jus cogens are a source of puzzlement.
Considering the “aftermath of the adjudication of mega-politics,” Alter and Madsen suggest that such adjudication is more likely to inflame stakeholders, and
therefore creates the risk that the decision remains a dead letter.96 Even more, it
may imply at worst, a high political risk for the authority of the court, affected by
the “flagrant disregard” of its decision.97
The jurisprudence of jus cogens has undoubtedly created such tensions. The
alleged uses and abuses of jus cogens by the IACtHR are one of the main reasons
for the current backlash against the Court.98 On 11 April 2019, the governments
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Paraguay sent a joint note regarding
92. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 114 (15 April
2009), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C74/DC1033_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MFJ3-U8TD] (“To summarize all the requirements for an investment to benefit from
the international protection of ICSID, the Tribunal considers that the following six elements have to be
taken into account: 1–a contribution in money or other assets; 2–a certain duration; 3–an element of risk;
4–an operation made in order to develop an economic activity in the host State; 5–assets invested in
accordance with the laws of the host State; 6–assets invested bona fide.”).
93. Id. ¶ 78.
94. Edoardo Stoppioni, Rethinking the Structures of the Hegemonic Discourse of the WTO Judge
and Investment Arbitrator: A Gramscian Analysis, LEGAL FORM (Oct. 26, 2018), https://legalform.blog/2018/10/26/rethinking-the-structures-of-the-hegemonic-discourse-of-the-wto-judge-and-investment-arbitrator-a-gramscian-analysis-edoardo-stoppioni/ [https://perma.cc/7Y9Q-U7UE].
95. Jean Combacau, Le Droit International: Bric-à-Brac ou Système?, 31 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 85 (1986).
96. Alter & Madsen, supra note 3, at 2, 9.
97. Id. at 2.
98. See generally Jorge Contesse, Resisting the Inter-American Human Rights System, 44 YALE J.
INT’L L. 179 (2019) (analyzing facets of resistance and backlash in the inter-American human rights system).
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the functioning of the inter-American system to Paulo Abrao, Secretary General
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The five governments declared to be very “worried” about the evolution of the Commission and proposed
“actions that will allow a better functioning of the system facing the challenges of
the [twenty-first] century.”99
The note highlights four points that constitute major national criticisms of the
Court’s functioning and the evolution of its legal reasoning: the role of subsidiarity, the use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, the case law on reparation,
and the use of international law sources. Behind these last criticisms, one can read
an allusion to the unwavering discovery of jus cogens norms. Specifically one can
see a criticism of the use of jus cogens to further restrict the margin of appreciation of states, either in terms of positive obligations to prevent gross violations of
these peremptory norms or in terms of the reparation due for their violation.100
The concerned states seem to criticise the use of this mega-political tool in circumstances where it is not necessary, with the effect of extending its perimeter
ad libitum without consideration of the high political consequences of such extension.
There is no answer in abstracto to this type of backlash. If one accepts that it
is generally true that the reading of a judicial decision is closely linked to the
political posture of the observer, it is even more true for decisions mobilizing
mega-political issues. Moreover, any disturbing discourse in a conservative field
will inevitably result in the responsible party being blamed. Cassese was well
aware of the criticism of utopianism when he called for greater judicial involvement in jus cogens: “is it feasible to expect states to modify their constitutions in
order to ensure the domestic impact of jus cogens or unreservedly to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ? Obviously not, and although we can be sure
that Nino Cassese knew this perfectly well, he nevertheless persisted.” 101
A different approach underlies the criticism regarding the supposed universality of a discourse based on jus cogens. As Koskenniemi states, “[T]he realist
critique usefully reminds us that, in law, political struggle is waged on what legal
words such as ‘aggression,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘self-defence,’ ‘terrorist,’ or ‘jus
cogens’ mean, whose policy they will include, and whose they will exclude. To
think of this struggle as hegemonic is to highlight that the contestants’ objective
is to make their partial view of the meaning appear to be the total view; their
99. Press Release, Comunicado de Prensa Ministerio de Relaciones Externales – Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos sobre Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (Apr. 23, 2019),
http://www.minjusticia.gob.cl/comunicado-de-prensa-ministerio-de-relaciones-exteriores-ministerio-dejusticia-y-derechos-humanos-sobre-sistema-interamericano-de-derechos-humanos/
[https://perma.cc/2US7-GELA].
100. Of course, interesting parallels could be drawn with the complex use of the margin of appreciation concept before the European Court of Human Rights, its political use of consensus and the relations
with national decision-makers. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and
Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999) (arguing that the European Court of Human Rights’s liberal use of the margin of appreciation doctrine may compromise the efforts of other
human rights bodies and national judges to set universal standards).
101. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 68, at 1055.
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preference seems like the universal preference.”102 That could be true, of course.
However, it would not fully explain why some countries belonging to the powerful First World group fear the judicial development of jus cogens so much. For
example, reverting to France’s stance, it is quite clear, even if not explicitly stated,
that their reluctance towards jus cogens is based on the fear that jus cogens would
develop in the direction of criminalizing colonization or declaring nuclear weapons unlawful. For sure, even the most determined state cannot counter the flow
of historical events being reconsidered or reviewed. However, looking for jus cogens as a tool for doing so, which is an existing temptation, supposes to consider
a different approach of jus cogens. In this view, jus cogens is not so much a tool
of universalism and hegemony, but rather an instrument of empowerment of the
vulnerable.
Recovering this conception of jus cogens as a tool for the emancipation of the
vulnerable can change our understanding of the normative question. For this reason, Part IV shifts the investigation’s perspective, looking at jus cogens from the
procedural perspective of the plaintiff. Indeed, one of the editors’ hypotheses is
that mega-political disputes, except for jurisdictional issues, were dormant during
the Cold War and awakened with the advent of a new kind of international
courts.103 What if the use of jus cogens was a sign of a new procedural maturity of
the post-Cold War international legal order? What if its systematic use by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights was the very corollary of the procedural
humanization of international law in the service of protecting the weakest? What
if its use as an erga omnes obligation began to make sense in a new international
context, embodied by the Gambia v Myanmar case?
IV
THE PROCEDURAL PROMISE OF JUS COGENS: CAN THE SUBALTERN ACT?
The mega-political nature of jus cogens is evident from the fact that it revolutionizes the traditional paradigms of the international legal order. Jus cogens embodies in international law a claim for profound structural transformation, which
this article has called the tectonics of mega-politics. Jus cogens has introduced
into the discourse of international law “ideologically charged connotations, the
materialization of which has turned out to be much more difficult than expected”
and “[b]y imposing shared values and aspirations applicable to all on a global
scale, it has also unleashed opposite forces aimed at fostering parochial interests.”104
Powerful and ideologically charged, the concept of jus cogens has undergone
a peculiar evolution that can be divided into two phases: rejection, and then enthusiasm. The mega-political demands that had been dormant during the Cold

102. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 113, 119 (2005).
103. See generally Alter & Madsen, supra note 3.
104. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 496.
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War were reawakened with the advent of a new kind of international court. The
question now is whether international tribunals use the full procedural potential
of jus cogens in contemporary international law, or whether these tribunals stifle
its potential in line with the posture of procedural avoidance.
In the first phase, jus cogens inspired a strong reluctance because of its architectural impact. The first generation of cases, mostly decided by the ICJ, avoided
applying jus cogens. As a result, these decisions were criticised by some as conservative and unnecessarily resistant. A second phase began in the post-Cold War
context. While the ICJ has consistently limited the procedural availability of jus
cogens, new-style tribunals have opted for various paths, either following the ICJ
or making a radical break with this conservative discourse. The latter posture
encountered the opposite criticism of judicial activism.
To articulate a universalist rhetoric that does not fall back on criticisms of
imperialism or Eurocentrism requires that jus cogens is reconsidered in light of
its history as a tool of emancipation. Feminist approaches to international law
deconstruct it along this logic.105 Similarly, the first generation of TWAIL characterized Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the
“greatest triumph” of the Non-Aligned Movement.106 If jus cogens is seen as a
tool for the empowerment of the vulnerable, its procedural impact is of fundamental importance.
However, it is interesting to keep in mind the ILC’s work on this topic in recent years. One can wonder if the final outcome, somehow distanced from the
work done by the Special Rapporteur, cannot be interpreted as a backlash against
judicial involvement regarding jus cogens. Indeed, the ILC report can be read as
reminding judges that they should not free themselves from state practice, more
or less in the same terms as what was done regarding international customary
law. The concession made to root such genealogy was to consider that, at the end
of the day, the customary process was the most likely one for the emergence of
jus cogens norms. It was a nice way of adding difficulty upon difficulty in the sense
that, would jus cogens norms be super customary rules, they would require mega
proof. In any event, the report can be read as a strong warning to adjudicators
not to depart from state practice.
In this context, considering jus cogens from a procedural point of view offers
the opportunity to take yet another perspective on it as a mega-political issue.
A. The Procedural Impact of Jus Cogens: A Dialectical Circle
There is a paradox in the way jus cogens has traditionally been treated in the
case-law. Today, the jurisprudence of jus cogens oscillates between the homeostatic conservatism of courts unwilling to accept its iconoclastic potential, and the
activism of courts that see it as the promise of a new paradigm in international
105. See generally Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM.
RTS. Q. 63 (1993).
106. Georges Abi-Saab, The Third World and the Future of the International Legal Order, 29 REVUE
EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27, 52 (1973).
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law. While the idea is supposed to have a powerful impact on the material structure of international law, courts have generally silenced this potential by arguing
the substantive power of jus cogens could not be activated because certain procedural preconditions were lacking. In doing so, international courts have not had
to draw any particular consequences from the qualification of a norm as peremptory.
The question of the procedural potential of jus cogens norms has been largely
underestimated, based on the binary reasoning that rules blocking jus cogens are
procedural and the jus cogens rules themselves are not procedural. Gradually,
the question becomes more acute of whether “normal” procedural rules should
be waived when jus cogens rules are applicable to the merits of a case.
As mentioned above, the ICJ has developed a rather conservative jurisprudence, hiding the jus cogens norm behind erga omnes obligations and claiming
their particular normative nature does not, by itself, create a basis for jurisdictional competence if this basis does not otherwise exist.107 More recently, the ICJ
has used the rhetoric of “procedure versus substance” to segment the reasoning
and prevent the complex materiality of jus cogens from generating the structural
transformation it could otherwise create. The jurisprudence on state immunity
provides a clear example of the homeostatic use of this line of argument. The idea
that jus cogens might call for an evolution of the theory of state immunity and a
broader jurisdiction of the national judge in mega-political cases has gradually
emerged in doctrine108 and practice, as the Italian example proves. The ICJ, in
the Germany v. Italy case, rejected the Italian theory that an exception to state
immunity existed under the Acta jure imperii doctrine in cases where a jus cogens
norm is violated.109 The Court’s reasoning was based on a “procedure versus substance” opposition: immunity is a procedural rule, and it ignores the content of
the substantive obligation violated.
The criticism of this very conservative view of immunities is well known.
Georges Scelle has already studied the theory of state immunity in light of the
inadequacies of the judicial function at the international level. According to him,
all international courts operate on the basis of state consent, but dédoublement
fonctionnel110 could compensate for this lack of compulsory jurisdiction. More
specifically, national judges could compensate for the lack of compulsory international jurisdiction by using their own office to act in the role of an international
107. See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30) (“[T]he erga omnes
character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things. Whatever the nature
of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its
judgment would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party
to the case. Where this is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes.”).
108. MICHEL COSNARD, LA SOUMISSION DES ÉTATS AUX TRIBUNAUX INTERNES: FACE A LA
THEORIE DES IMMUNITES DES ÉTATS (1996).
109. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 99, ¶¶ 92-97 (February 3).
110. Dédoublement fonctionnel is the idea that a public authority can act on behalf of two different
parties at the same time. Here, it refers to a national judge that also acts in the role of an international
judge.

RUIZ FABRI & STOPPIONI (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2021]

1/13/2022 1:40 PM

JUS COGENS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS

175

agent. However, according to Scelle, the wide-ranging scope of immunities blocks
the potential effect of functional duplication. The national judge is paralysed by
state immunities and a wide range of other circumstances, so that “nous nous
permettrons … de qualifier cette coutume de vicieuse, du point de vue de la technique juridique. Elle aboutit à paralyser la fonction juridictionnelle dans des cas si
nombreux et des proportions si considérables qu’elle compromet sérieusement la
réalisation de l’ordre juridique international.”111
What Scelle criticized as a coutume odieuse112 seems to remain as it was, blocking the procedural potential of jus cogens. Indeed, the Court did not directly answer the Italian argument asserting that procedural norms for reparation of jus
cogens violations were themselves jus cogens norms, implying a shift in their
proper judicial treatment.113
A very different attitude stems from judicial discourse in the inter-American
context. In the Goiburu case, the Court found that the right of access to a national
judge to invoke one’s human rights violations is a peremptory norm.114 This is a
departure from the philosophy outlined above. The elevation of this procedural
right to jus cogens status calls into question the procedural versus substantive divide applied in other contexts. The iconoclastic potential of such a claim seems
obvious: depending in part on who is the holder of such a right, it would compete
with the consensual principle that forms part of the backbone of traditional international law.
The second line of jurisprudence that highlights this dialectical oscillation
concerns the burden of proof regarding the violation of jus cogens norms. The
practice of international tribunals reveals that procedure is also used as a tool to
avoid a decision on the merits in cases of jus cogens violations. The preferred
procedural tool for avoidance is the standard of proof, the idea being that extreme gravity requires extreme evidential certainty. In its decision in Bosnia v.
Serbia, the ICJ theorized the existence of a higher standard of proof in genocide
claims:
The Court has long recognized that claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive (cf. Corfu Channel
(United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 17). The Court requires
that it be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of
genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have been
clearly established. The same standard applies to the proof of attribution for such acts.115

111. “[W]e may, however, call this custom vicious, from the point of view of legal technique. It results
in the paralysis of the jurisdictional function in so many cases and to such a considerable extent that it
seriously compromises the realisation of the international legal order.” GEORGES SCELLE, COURS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 790–92 (1948).
112. “Odious custom.”
113. Erik Fusshoeller, Is the Obligation to Make Reparation for the Breach of a Jus Cogens Obligation a Jus Cogens Obligation on Itself? (2012) (LL.M. thesis, University of Oslo) (on file with the Law
Library, University of Oslo).
114. Goiburú v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (Ser. C)
No. 153, ¶ 131 (Sept. 22, 2006).
115. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz.
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This idea, that “mega-standards” lead to the need for “mega-evidence,” is
confirmed in international criminal law. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), in their landmark decisions on genocide, have considered
that the proof of genocide should focus on dolus specialis.116 Thus, in the Tadic
and Akayesu cases, the judges asked for evidence of this additional intent.117 The
ILC report on jus cogens, which takes stock of the international case-law as its
main material, while stressing the fact that state practice should be at the forefront, confirms this logic of mega-proof for mega-norms.118
However, this position makes proving jus cogens violations extremely difficult, which contradicts the axiological importance of the value at stake. The result
of the axiological verticalization is the strengthening of procedural requirements,
so that the violation of the highest values is procedurally more difficult to prove.
This approach may run counter to the pro victima reading of the Inter-American
Court, which tends to see jus cogens as a tool for empowering the individual.
If the violation of jus cogens is difficult to judge before the national judge and
difficult to prove before the international judge, then the idea that this megapolitical issue is reawakening before international courts after the Cold War
should be nuanced. Nevertheless, some judicial discourses offer alternatives for
thinking about the evolution of the international legal order.
B. Avenues for the Emancipatory Potential of Jus Cogens?
When Cassese writes that judges should be trusted to make jus cogens a reality, he does not blindly and utopianly assume that judges would be idealists.
Rather, he expresses the conviction that someone with authoritative speech and
the ability to make binding decisions is needed to realize the promise of jus cogens. However, neither extreme of this judicial dialectic offers a solution: “Jus
cogens may not sweep everything away when applied to a case . . . And yet it
would be a defeat for the international community to get rid of the concept altogether, reneging on the difficult but ultimately successful building up of communitarian values.”120 The wisest way to disentangle this complex relationship between international courts and jus cogens lies in the concept of teleological
interpretation: “Rather than focussing on the hierarchical superiority of the rule
and its mechanical application, regard should be had to implementing effectively
119

v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 209 (Feb. 26).
116. Dolus specialis refers to the special intent to destroy a protected group required for an act to be
considered genocide.
117. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 273-305 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 510-24 (Sep. 2, 1998).
118. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at 168-70
(2019).
119. Cassese, supra note 67, at 166.
120. Bianchi, supra note 80, at 503.
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its underlying values, taking context duly into account.”121
A key perspective is to emphasize the procedural aspects of jus cogens. The
main bottleneck in the genesis of jus cogens is procedural.122 But at the same time,
the procedural potential of jus cogens can create room for its historical emancipatory role. This emancipatory seed is the common grammar that seems to bind
the TWAIL voices. For some of them, the real benefit of the concept is to
strengthen the claims of independence and self-determination of those who had
been reduced to subalterns123 and ensure that their voices are heard when they
articulate jus cogens “in their actual experience of struggle and cooperation.”124
Furthermore, the strength of jus cogens lies in its ability to consolidate the
emerging transformations of the post-decolonization context, bringing with it
“the necessary ballast to keep the ship of society stable and steady.”125 These
ideas have been insightfully summarized in Bedjaoui’s book, which argues that
jus cogens offers the prospect that the old paradigm of international law “might
finally be replaced with a genuinely inclusive and participatory order.”126 This
was already forty years ago. However, in this line, the post-Cold War judicial experience may offer some insights into thinking about jus cogens as a procedural
tool for a more inclusive and participatory international legal order. As discussed
below, there are two possible dimensions that deserve to be highlighted.
First, jus cogens can be seen as a powerful provider of intersystemic linkages,
an idea in line with the tectonics of mega-politics. The General Court of the European Union’s reasoning in its 2005 Kadi decision contrasts with the strong dualism of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice in its subsequent decision
upon appeal. The General Court had considered that it could go beyond the separation of legal orders and verify that Security Council resolutions did not violate
jus cogens.
[T]he Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the
Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, understood as a body of higher
rules of public international law binding on all subjects of international law, including
the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible.127

121. Id. at 504.
122. Ruiz Fabri, supra note 30.
123. Subaltern refers to populations that are historically repressed and subject to more powerful classes. This term is especially used in TWAIL approaches to speak of Third World peoples, most of the time
formerly colonized.
124. Merlin M. Magallona, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 51 PHIL. L.J. 521, 523 (1976).
125. V. Nageswar Rao, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 14 INDIAN J.
INT’L L. 362, 368 (1974).
126. Özsu, supra note 12, at 307.
127. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3724 ¶ 226. The General Court
clarified the inter-systemic dimension of the dispute: “[I]n so far as the alleged infringements arise exclusively from the freezing of the applicant’s funds, as decided by the Security Council, through its Sanctions
Committee, and put into effect by the contested regulation, without the exercise of any discretion whatsoever, it is in principle by the sole criterion of the standard of universal protection of the fundamental
rights of the human person falling within the ambit of jus cogens that the applicant’s claims may appropriately be examined, in accordance with the principles set out above.” Id. ¶ 235.
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The Court of Justice did not maintain this line of argument and preferred to
follow a more classical dualist reasoning, based on the distinction between the
international and EU legal orders. However, what is interesting here is not so
much the final outcome of the decision.128 Rather, the interesting point is the theoretical position that the iconoclastic nature of jus cogens may allow for a rethinking of models of inter-system relations.
Second, the erga omnes character of any jus cogens norm may be the new
procedural path for future developments in the international legal order concerning mega-political issues. It is in this sense that the ICTY elaborated in the Furundzjia case on the possible systemic corollaries of the peremptory nature of a
norm:
The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has other
effects at the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising torture. It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the jus cogens
value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or customary rules providing for torture
would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State say, taking national
measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty law. If such a situation were to arise, the national measures, violating the general
principle and any relevant treaty provision, would produce the legal effects discussed
above and in addition would not be accorded international legal recognition. Proceedings could be initiated by potential victims if they had locus standi before a competent
international or national judicial body with a view to asking it to hold the national measure to be internationally unlawful; or the victim could bring a civil suit for damage in a
foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter alia to disregard the legal value of
the national authorising act.129

The recent Gambia v. Myanmar case may lead to a new era in the procedural
analysis of mega-political disputes, including the procedural development of actio
popularis. This development is in line with the emancipatory promise of jus cogens. As Pierre-Marie Dupuy puts it, “The concept of jus cogens and its initial
inclusion in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties were
above all a victory for the South over the West. And ‘obligations erga omnes’, set
forth in the famous paragraph 33 of the International Court of Justice’s ruling in
the Barcelona Traction case was not intended to please Western states, but rather
to encourage developing countries to once again go down the ICJ route, which
they had abandoned following its ultra-conservative decision in the South-West
African case.”130

128. The jus cogens norm nevertheless encapsulates important limitations, in the reasoning of the
court: “[T]he Court considers that the limitation of the applicant’s right of access to a court, as a result of
the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed as a rule, in the domestic legal order of the Member States of the
United Nations, by resolutions of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, in accordance with the relevant principles of international law (in particular Articles 25
and 103 of the Charter), is inherent in that right as it is guaranteed by jus cogens.” Id. ¶ 288.
129. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1995) (citation omitted).
130. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to
Universal Values: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 132, 134 (2005).
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A related issue is the potential of jus cogens to expand the scope of intervention before the ICJ. The multiple interventions announced by states in Gambia
v. Myanmar and the Court’s forthcoming response to them may prove beneficial
in assessing the procedural potential of jus cogens. The Court will likely be called
upon to rule on interventions under Articles 62 and 63 of its Statute. Under Article 62, states must demonstrate a special interest in the case to intervene, even
as a non-party. Nevertheless, an expanded view of the jus cogens doctrine envisages a broader possibility of intervention in the case of an erga omnes obligation,131 which would ultimately amount to extending the logic of actio popularis
to intervention. The idea would be that for the violation of peremptory norms,
the greatest number of voices deserve to be heard, so that justice is done. The
development of case law on this point will have to be closely followed.
In a famous text, Gayatri Spivak defended the idea that “the phased development of the subaltern is complicated by the imperialist project.”132 Therefore,
from the perspective of the subaltern, a fundamental question arises:
According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardisation and
regimentation of socialised capital, though they do not seem to recognise this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here),
and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work
here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialised capital,
inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education
supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak?133

In accordance with its emancipatory historical genome, jus cogens poses the
same question to the international legal order. International courts are increasingly called upon to answer them.
V
CONCLUSION
The political science approach to the judicialization of mega-politics encourages one to step back and examine the operation of international law in megapolitical issues from a meta-theoretical perspective. Concerns about the morphology of mega-political issues seem to point towards a blockage of judicial intervention. This judicial paralysis goes hand in hand with the traditional view of the
issues surrounding jus cogens adjudication, especially by positivist jurists. Now
that it is becoming increasingly politically correct to say that the ICJ should rule
on these issues, it is necessary to reflect on the possible evolution of the surrounding problems. Jus cogens cases are consubstantially linked to mega-political as-

131. Beatrice I. Bonafé, Interests of a Legal Nature Justifying Intervention Before the ICJ, 25 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 739, 739–57 (2012) (exploring the different types of legal interest that could justify permitting
a third state to intervene before the ICJ).
132. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 66, 78 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).
133. Id.
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pects, and fears continue to be expressed about the adequacy and the consequences of intervention by international judges.
Nancy Fraser has developed a fascinating distinction between “normal justice” and “abnormal justice.” She argues that public debates about justice sometimes adopt an ordinary discourse, as participants share certain underlying assumptions about what a demand for justice is: who the actors entitled to a claim
are, who the agency of redress is, who the recipients of these claims are, and what
the social cleavages that may harbour the injustices being contested are.134 But in
other cases, the discourse may become one of abnormal justice when all these
underlying assumptions are not shared, and instead, the answers to these questions are at stake. In cases of “abnormal justice,” the judicial mandate is pushed
to its limits. The limits of the game itself are challenged: “[n]ot only substantive
questions, but also the grammar of justice itself, are up for grabs.”135 From this
perspective, Nancy Fraser has identified problems of “metapolitical injustice”:
“In addition to ordinary-political injustice, which arises within the frame of a
bounded polity, we can also conceptualise another level, call it metapolitical injustice, which arises as a result of the division of political space into bounded polities. This second level comprehends injustices of misframing.”136
This mega-political investigation aimed to highlight the benefits of a new conception of jus cogens as an emancipatory tool that addresses these structural
problems of mis-framing, in line with its original Third World historical project.
Our central thesis concerns the evolution of the jus cogens approach in international litigation. The concept has long been approached from a purely substantive
perspective, with all the risks arising from its axiological materiality. This view
has triggered a criticism of jus cogens as a Eurocentric and ideologized tool. Nevertheless, this description clashes with the historical reality of jus cogens, which
has emerged as a tool to strengthen Third World claims.
Following the thinking of those who have tried to restore the emancipatory
potential of jus cogens for the most vulnerable, this article argues that the procedural side of history remains open to allow a reconciliation between this historical
ontology of the instrument and its judicial use. The traditional “procedure versus
substance” divide used by the ICJ to avoid certain issues can be nuanced. Jus
cogens can become a fundamental tool for procedural justice if its procedural potential is further explored.

134. See generally Nancy Fraser, Abnormal Justice, 34 CRITICAL INQUIRY 393 (2008).
135. Id. at 395.
136. Id. at 408.

